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STENBERG V. CARHART: WOMEN RETAIN
THEIR RIGHT TO CHOOSE
Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597 (2000)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Stenberg v. Carhart,' the Supreme Court held that a Ne-
braska statute banning partial birth abortions was unconstitu-
tional. In a 5-4 decision, the Court concluded that: (1) the
statute lacked any exception for the preservation of the health
of the mother;2 and (2) the statute as impermissibly vague and
could be interpreted to include a ban on the most commonly
used second trimester abortions, thereby unduly burdening a
woman's right to choose abortion.3 For these two distinct rea-
sons, the Nebraska statute banning partial birth abortions was
rendered unconstitutional.
This Note argues that the judgment of the Court was cor-
rect.4 The Note explains why the absence of a health exception
in the statute rendered the entire statute unconstitutional and
discusses why the statute could be interpreted to include a ban
on multiple methods of abortion.5 This Note further argues
that the Supreme Court should have declared a broader hold-
ing on this issue.6 By first addressing the issues of the health ex-
ception and the plain language interpretation, the Court did
not have the opportunity to reach the issue of whether a nar-
rowly tailored statute prohibiting only one method of abortion,
specifically the Dilation and Extraction procedure (D&X),
would in itself constitute an undue burden Ultimately, this
Note concludes that a ban of the D&X alone would, in fact, im-
1 120 S. Ct. 2597 (2000).
2 Id. at 2620.
3
id.
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pose an undue burden on a woman's right to choose abortion
and, therefore, should be deemed unconstitutional.8
A. BACKGROUND
1. The Right to Privacy
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right to
privacy.9 However, the Supreme Court has recognized that a
right of personal privacy does exist under the Constitution.'0
The Court has opined that this right of personal privacy has its
roots in the First Amendment; the Fourth Amendment;"
within the penumbra of the Bill of Rights;" in the Ninth14
Amendment; or in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept ofpersonal liberty.15 And, this right of privacy has been found to
'Id.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
10 Id. See also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 9 (1968); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
"Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565:
If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a state has no business telling
a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read, or what films he may watch.
Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to
control men's minds.
12 Teny, 392 U.S. at 9 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 361 (1967))
(stating that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places, and thus, wherever
an individual may harbor a reasonable "expectation of privacy," he is entitled to be
free from unreasonable governmental intrusion).
" Griswod, 381 U.S. at 484 ("[s]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have pe-
numbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance. Various guarantees [within the Bill of Rights] create zones of privacy.").
Id. at 491 (Goldberg,J., concurring):
To hold that a right so basic and fundamental and so deep-rooted in our society as
the right of privacy in marriage may be infringed because that right is not guaranteed in so
many words by the first eight amendments to the Constitution is to ignore the Ninth
Amendment and to give it no effect whatsoever.
" Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (arguing that the liberty guaranteed in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses more than the freedom from
bodily restraint, including inter alia the right to marry, to establish a home, to bring
up children, and generally to enjoy those privileges recognized as essential to the or-
derly pursuit of happiness by free men).
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• 16 17extend to marriage; procreation; contraception;' familial re-lationships;19 and child rearing.20
2. The Supreme Court Recognizes a Woman's Constitutional Right to Choose
Whether or Not to Terminate Her Pregnancy
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court recognized that the right
of privacy, founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of
personal liberty and upheld by years of Supreme Court prece-
dent, is in fact broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.2' For the first time
in the United States, laws that called for an absolute proscrip-
tion on abortion were deemed unconstitutional.2
Although the Court concluded that our right to personal
privacy includes the abortion decision, it was made clear that
the right is qualified and must be considered against important
state interests in regulation23 Simply stated, the right to termi-
nate a pregnancy is not absolute.24 However, where certain fun-
damental rights are involved, including the right to terminate a
pregnancy, the Court has held that any regulations affecting
" See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 18 (1967) (holding that anuimiscegenauon
statutes are unconstitutional because they deprive appellants of a liberty, the right to
marry, without due process of law).
17 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that state statute
mandating the sterilization of repeat criminal offenders violates the Due Process
Clause because procreation is a basic civil right of man).
's See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child.").
'9 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (arguing that there is a pri-
vate realm of family life that the state cannot enter).
20 See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (stating that the theory
of liberty excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children, as par-
ents have the right to raise their own children).
2' Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. In so holding, the court reasoned that by denying this
choice, the state would impose too much of a burden on women. First and foremost,
medical issues may be involved. Moreover, maternity or additional children could
force upon a woman a distressful life and future. And, psychological harm may be
imminent, as mental and physical health can be taxed by child care. The court also
took into consideration the distress associated with an unwanted child or bringing a
child into a family already unable to care for it.
2 2 Id.




those rights may be justified only by a compelling and legitimate
state interest.25 Also, any legislative enactments must be nar-
rowly drawn to express only those compelling and legitimate
state interests at stake.26
As the Justices have noted, a state may properly assert le-
gitimate interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining medi-
cal standards, and in protecting potential life.2 7 And, at some
point during pregnancy, all these interests become sufficiently
"compelling" to warrant regulation of the abortion process.
To that end, the Court established the trimester framework ap-
proach to abortion regulation.2
With respect to the state's legitimate interest in protecting
the health of the mother, the point at which the interest be-
came "compelling" was at the end of the first trimester.0 This
was so because until that point in a pregnancy, mortality in
abortion could actually be less than mortality in childbirth. 3'
Hence, during the first trimester, the abortion decision and any
related matters, would be left to the medical judgment of the
pregnant women and her doctor, and could not be regulated by
the state.32
During the second trimester of pregnancy, a state could
regulate the abortion procedures, but only to the extent that
the regulation reasonably related to the preservation and pro-
tection of the woman's health.3 Examples of permissible state
regulations in this area included requirements concerning the
qualifications of the person performing the abortion, the licen-




2'7 Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
28 Id.
2Id. at 164-65.
'0 Id. at 163.
" m at 163.
12 Id. at 164.




With respect to the state's legitimate interest in protecting
potential life, the "compelling" point was at viability. 3 This was
so because until viability, the fetus is incapable of a meaningful
life outside of the womb.! Hence, for the stage subsequent to
viability (approximately the beginning of the third trimester to
the end of the pregnancy), the Court held that the State, in
promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life, may
regulate and even proscribe abortion, except where it is neces-
sary for the preservation of the health of the mother.3'
3. A Statute Prohibiting a Particular Method of Abortion Violates a Woman's
Fundamental Right to Choose Abortion, as established in Roe v. Wade
Throughout the seventies and eighties, the essential holding
of Roe was consistently reaffirmed. s' A notable case in the mid-
seventies to uphold Roe was Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri
v. Danforth.9 The issue in Danforth concerned a particular sec-
tion of a Missouri statute regulating abortions that proscribed
the use of saline amniocentesis, a method of abortion com-
monly used after the first twelve weeks of pregnancy."' The stat-
ute imposed this proscription on the grounds that the
technique was deleterious to maternal health.
-,
The Supreme Court concluded that this proscription was
unconstitutional, based on its holding in Roe." The general
prohibition of saline amniocentesis failed as a reasonable regu-
S Id.
s Id. at 163. In order to be deemed viable, the fetus must have a potentiality for
meaningful life, as opposed to merely survivaL See also Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379,
387 (1979) (emphasis added). A physician determines whether or not a fetus is ca-
pable of meaningful life after considering a number of variables, including the gesta-
tional age of the fetus (derived from the reported menstrual history of the woman),
fetal weight (based on an inexact estimate of the size and condition of the uterus),
the woman's general health and nutrition, and the quality of the available medical fa-
cilities. Id. at 395-96.
37 Id. at 164-65.
See, e.g., Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975); Collauti, 439 U.S. at 387; Ak-
ron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Thomburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
39 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
' Id. at 75-76. In a saline amniocentesis abortion, the amniotic fluid is withdrawn
and saline or other fluid is inserted into the amniotic sac.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 79.
20011
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lation for the protection of maternal health.43 The Court rea-
soned that other permitted methods were more dangerous to the
health of the mother and were less widely used and accepted."
In fact, the statute did not even prohibit techniques that were
many times more likely to result in maternal death, forcing
women and their physicians to terminate pregnancies by meth-
ods more dangerous to the pregnant woman's health than the
method outlawed.45
Instead, the Court noted, the statute was an unreasonable
and arbitrary regulation intended to inhibit the majority of sec-
ond trimester abortions, as 68 percent to 80 percent of all sec-
ond trimester abortions were effected through the saline
amniocentesis procedure.4 6
Following the Roe trimester framework, as the Court in Dan-
forth did, states could regulate abortions during the second tri-
mester. However, the regulations must be related to protecting
a woman's health and may not be detrimental to a woman
choosing to undergo an abortion.48 Thus, the Missouri statute
did not withstand constitutional challenge.49
4. The Central Theme of Roe is Upheld, But the Supreme Court Rejects the
Trimester Framework, Giving Power Back to the States in the Battle Over
Abortion Rights
In 1992, the issue of abortion again reached the Supreme
Court with the watershed case of Planned Parenthood of SE Penn-
sylvania v. Casey.50 And, once again, the essential holding of
Roe--woman have the fundamental, yet qualified, right to
choose abortion' -was upheldY. However, in this case, the
43 Id.
' Id. at 77.
* Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 78 (1976).
,6 Id. at 79. Today, however, the medical profession has switched from medical in-
duction of labor to surgical procedures for most second trimester abortions. See
Stenberg, 120 S. Ct. at 2606.
17 Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
" SeeJennifer Landrum Elliott, Will Charlie Brown Finally Kick the Football?: Missouri
Enacts the Next Generation of Partial Birth Abortion Restrictions, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1083,
1092 (Summer 2000).
49 Danforth, 428 U.S. at 79.
50 505 U.S 833 (1992).
" Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
342 [Vol. 91
STENBERG V. CARHART
Court asserted that the trimester approach established in Roe"
undervalued the state's interest in potential life.- In another 5-
4 decision, the Court found that to deem unwarranted all gov-
ernmental attempts to regulate previability abortions solely on
behalf of potential life is irreconcilable with the Court's recog-
nition in Roe that there is, in fact, a substantial state interest in
protecting potential life throughout the pregnancy."5 "The
woman's liberty is not so unlimited. . . that from the outset the
State cannot show its concern for the life of the unborn." ' And
with this conclusion, the Court rejected the long-standing tri-
mester framework.57
Again, the Court concluded that the essential holding of Roe
should be reaffirmed: women do have the fundamental right to
terminate a pregnancy before the fetus attains viability.'s How-
ever, to replace the rejected trimester approach, the majority
decided that simple "viability," and not trimesters, would mark
the point at which the state's interest in protecting potential life
would outweigh the pregnant woman's liberty interest in having
an abortion.5 9 A woman may choose to terminate her pregnancy
previability.6 Once the fetus becomes viable, however, the state
may proscribe abortion altogether.6' It is important to note that
while states may proscribe abortions of viable fetuses, the Court
held that those regulations must contain exceptions for preg-
nancies that endanger the woman's life or healthfri
52 Casey, 505 U.S. at 869.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65
Casey, 505 U.S. at 873.
"Id. at 876.
"Id. at 869.
' d. at 873.
Id. at 871-72.
'9 Id. at 870.
62 Casey, 505 U.S. at 870.
" Id. The Court reasoned that subsequent to viability, there is a realistic possibility
of maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb. Thus, the independent exis-
tence of the second life can in reason and all fairness be the object of state protection
that now overrides the rights of the woman. Id.
" Id. at 879 ("Subsequent to viability, the state in promoting its interest in the po-
tentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion ex-
cept where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of
the life or health of the mother.")
2001] 343
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Additionally, the Court gave the states greater latitude in
governing previability abortions by holding that states are con-
stitutionally permitted to regulate, but not proscribe, previabil-
ity abortions based solely on their interest in respecting
potential life, so long as the specific regulations do not impose an
undue burden on the woman seeking the abortion. 3
This brings us to the obvious and often debated question:
what constitutes an undue burden?o The Court described an
undue burden as any state regulation that has the purpose or ef-
fect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.0 The Court further
explained that the only issue at stake under the new "undue
burden" regime is the woman's right to make the ultimate deci-
sion whether to terminate her pregnancy. s Regulations which
do no more than create a mechanism for the state to express re-
spect for the life of the unborn are, therefore, allowed, provided
they do not constitute a substantial obstacle to the woman's
right to choose. 7
63 Id. at 874 ("Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a
woman's ability to make this decision does the power of the state reach into the heart
of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.")
6 Id. at 881-901. Is an informed consent requirement an undue burden? Is a pa-
rental notification requirement an undue burden? Is a spousal notification require-
ment an undue burden? Do recordkeeping and reporting requirements constitute
an undue burden?
6' Id. at 877.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
67 Id. An informed consent requirement, mandating that at least 24 hours before
performing an abortion, a physician must inform the woman of the availability of in-
formation relating to fetal development and the assistance available should she de-
cide to carry the pregnancy to full term, is a reasonable measure to ensure an
informed choice and is, therefore, not an "undue burden." Id. at 883. A provision
requiring spousal notice prior to terminating a pregnancy constitutes an "undue bur-
den" because a husband has no enforceable right to require his wife to advise him be-
fore she exercises her personal choices and fundamental rights. Id. at 897-98. A
requirement that a minor seeking an abortion obtain the consent of a parent or
guardian, provided that there is an adequate judicial bypass procedure, does not im-
pose an "undue burden" on the woman seeking the abortion and is, therefore, consti-
tutional. Id. at 899. Recordkeeping and reporting requirements do not constitute
"undue burdens" because they relate to maternal health, while imposing no substan-
tial obstacle to the woman's choice. Id. at 900-01.
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5. The Circuits are Split: Do Bans on Partial Birth Abortions Impose an
"Undue Burden" on a Woman's Right to Terminate Her Pregnancy?
Since the Danforth majority held that banning the saline
amniocentesis method of abortion was unconstitutional, there
has been no other abortion method to receive such national
scrutiny-until the D&X procedure was developed.0 The D&X,
often performed on nonviable fetuses, is ordinarily associated
with the term "partial birth abortion." 0 However "partial birth
abortion" is a layman's term with no medical basis and does not
reflect the medical definition of the D&X procedure.70
In 1993, Dr. Martin Haskell presented his paper, Dilation
and Extraction (D&X) for Late Second Trimester Abortion,7' to
Congress, prompting nationwide concern over the D&X proce-
dure. In response, Congress twice passed a federal ban on so-
called "Partial birth abortions," which President Clinton twice
vetoed.7  Subsequently, more than one-half of the states in the
country passed similar bans, modeled after the 1997 federal
bill.7 ' Not surprisingly, the majority of these statutes have been
challenged; 75 the decisions have been split.
In late 1997, the Sixth Circuit became the first Federal
Court of Appeals to hold, in a 2-1 decision, that a state statute
banning previability "partial birth" abortions was unconstitu-
tional.7' An Ohio statute attempting to ban the D&X proce-
duren was deemed an undue burden on women seeking
6s See Karen E. Walther, Comment, Partial-BbiMt Abortions: Should Moral Judgment Pre-
vail Over MedicalJudgment?, 31 LOY. U. CHi. LJ. 693, 706 (2000). Very recently, Mife-
pristone, better known as the "abortion pill" or RU-486, a new method of non-surgical
abortion, has also received a great deal of national scrutiny. See Gina Kolata, It's
Ready, But Is It Wanted?, N.Y. TftES, November 19, 2000, at D2.
69 Stenberg, 120 S. Ct. at 2601. For a more thorough discussion of the D&X proce-
dure, see infra Part HI.
7' Walther, supra note 68, at 706. See also Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 863
(7th Cir. 1999) ("The legal definition is an imperfect match for the medical defini-
tion of D&X.").
71 Martin Haskell, M.D., Dilation and Extraction for Late Second Trimester Abor-
tion, reprinted in 139 CONG. REC. E1092 (daily ed. April 29, 1993).
7See Walther, supra note 68, at 706.
nd., at 706-07.
7' Id., at 707.
7 d., at 708.
"'Woman's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 203 (6th Cir. 1997).
'7 See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2919.15(B). The actual statute provided, "[n]o per-
son shall knowingly perform or attempt to perform a dilation and extraction [D&X]
2001] 345
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previability abortions because the statute was unconstitutionally
vague and could be interpreted to include a ban on the more
commonly employed dilation and evacuation (D&E) method of
abortion.78 Such a broad ban of procedures, the Court opined,
placed a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking pre-
viability abortions.7
The Fourth Circuit followed suit in 1998 when it affirmed a
District Court's stay on the ban of pre-viability partial birth abor-
tions in Virginia." According to the Fourth Circuit, the Virginia
Act at issue used a definition of partial birth abortion that was
intentionally broader than the medical descriptions of the D&X
procedure.8 As the opinion states, the D&X procedure is the
target of the Act, but "the definition of 'partial birth abortion'
used by the General Assembly is cast in terms that will encom-
pass not only the identified medical formulations of the proce-
dure, but as-yet unidentified and/or uninvented variations of,, ,,12
the D&X procedure.
Further, in 1999, the Eighth Circuit struck down statutes in
Iowa, Arkansas, and Nebraska banning partial birth abortions
because the statutes imposed an undue burden on women seek-
ing previability abortions.3 In each of these cases, the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, like the Sixth and Fourth Cir-
cuits before it, held that the statutes prohibiting partial birth
abortions, or the so-called D&X procedure, encompassed other
methods of abortion that were constitutionally protected, such
as the D&E procedure, the most commonly used second-
procedure upon a pregnant woman." D&X was defined as, "the termination of a
human pregnancy by purposely inserting a suction device into the skull of a fetus to
remove the brain. 'Dilation and extraction procedure' does not include either the
suction curettage procedure of abortion or the suction aspiration procedure of abor-
tion." For further explanation of the D&X procedure, see infra Part III(B) (3).
7' See Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 202-03. For a thorough description of the dilation and
evacuation procedure (D&E), see infta Part III (B) (2).
71 See Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 202-03.
" See Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 183 F.3d 303, 303 (4th Cir.
1998).
" See id. at 304.
82 id.
" See Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 195 F.3d 386, 388-89 (8th Cir. 1999) (striking
down Iowa statute); Little Rock Family Planning Servs. v.Jegley, 192 F.3d 794, 797-98
(8th Cir. 1999) (striking down Arkansas statute); Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142,
1151 (8th Cir. 1999) (striking down Nebraska statute).
346 [Vol. 91
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trimester procedure. 4 To that end, the statutes imposed an un-
due burden on a woman's choice to exercise her fundamental
right to an abortionss
The Seventh Circuit, however, disagreed!r  In contrast to
the above-mentioned holdings, the Seventh Circuit concluded
that even though the legal definition of a partial birth abortion
is an "imperfect match" for the medical definition of the D&X
procedure, the statutes in question clearly communicate that
the ban on partial birth abortions is intended to extend only toD 117
the D&X method. The Court held that a prohibition of the
D&X procedure does not constitute an undue burden on a
woman's right to choose an abortion because a D&X procedure
is never the only safe method of second-trimester abortions.3
In order to resolve the split among the Circuits, the Su-
preme Court, in 2000, granted certiorari to a case addressing
the constitutionality of state statutes banning partial birth abor-
tions."'
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A- STATEMENT OF FACTS
In June 1997, Nebraska's Governor signed into law Legisla-
tive Bill 23,90 prohibiting partial birth abortions in the state of
Nebraska.9' Because "partial birth abortion" is not a recognized
medical term, the statute defined a "partial birth abortion" as:
[A]n abortion procedure in which the person performing the abortion
partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the un-
born child and completing the delivery. For purposes of this subdivi-
sion, the term partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before
SeeMiller, 195 F.3d at 388-89;Jegy, 192 F.3d at 797-98; Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1151.
8' SeeMiler, 195 F.3d at 388-89;Jege),, 192 F.3d at 797-98; Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1151.
See Hope; 195 F.3d at 863.
8 See id.
See id. at 864-65.
See Stenberg, 120 S. Ct. at 2597.
See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-328(1). The text of the statute reads "[n]o partial-birth
abortion shall be performed in this state, unless such procedure is necessary to save
the life of the mother whose life is endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness,
or physical injury, including a life-endangering physical condition caused by or aris-
ing from the pregnancy itself."
91 SeeCarhart v. Stenberg, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1101 (D. Neb. 1998).
20011
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killing the unborn child means deliberately and intentionally delivering
into the vagina a living unborn child, or a substantial portion thereof,
for the purpose of performing a procedure that the person performing
such procedure knows will kill the unborn child and does kill the un-
born child.
92
The statute made the intentional and knowing performance
of an unlawful partial-birth abortion a Class III felony, with a
maximum prison term of twenty years and up to $25,000 in
fines.93 Also, a violation of the statute served as grounds for
automatic suspension and revocation of an attending physi-
cian's license to practice medicine in Nebraska. 94
Dr. Leroy Carhart, a medical doctor, challenged the consti-
tutionality of the statute and, in 1997, brought a lawsuit in Fed-
eral District Court seeking a preliminary injunction regarding
the enforcement of the statute.95 Upon asserting his claim, Dr.
Carhart operated a family medical practice with a specialized
abortion facility in Nebraska. 6 He was licensed to practice
medicine in eight states and performed abortions in a clinic set-
ting from a gestational age of three weeks until fetal viability.
9 7
The abortion procedures that Dr. Carhart utilized varied, de-
pending on the gestational age of the fetus, as well as on various
other medical factors.98
Dr. Carhart based his constitutional challenge on the claim
that the ban on partial-birth abortions imposed an undue bur-
den on a woman seeking an abortion by preventing her from
choosing a safe and desired method of terminating the preg-
nancy before viability." This, as established in Casey, was in vio-
lation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'00 In the alternative, Dr. Carhart based his claim
on his belief that the statute was unconstitutionally vague, as it
' Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-326(9).
See id. at § 28-328(2).
See Carhart, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1101.
See id. at 1109.
See Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1146.
17 See id.
See id.
See Carhart, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1120-21.
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 874.
[Vol. 91
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could be interpreted to prohibit more than solely the D&X pro-
cedure. 01
B. METHODS OF ABORTION
In order to fully understand the issues surrounding the ban
of partial birth abortions, it is important to gain a preliminary
understanding of all available abortion procedures "
1. Suction Curettage or Vacuum Aspiration
About ninety percent of all abortions performed in the
United States take place during the first trimester of pregnancy,
prior to the twelfth week of gestational age.' 3 The most com-
mon means of inducing first trimester abortions is the suction
curettage or vacuum aspiration method.' In this procedure, a
local anesthetic is administered, and the cervix is dilated using
rigid dilators 05 Once the cervix is sufficiently dilated, a suction
tube is inserted and rotated inside the uterus to loosen and re-
move the contents.05 A curette may then be used to scrape the
endometrium, ensuring the removal of any remaining tissue
that could cause infection.' The fetus is not dead before the at-
tending physician begins this procedure, and the entire fetus
comes through the suction tube alive in many instances.' 3
Such an abortion is typically performed on an outpatient
basis and is considered particularly safe.' 9 In fact, the mortality
rates for first trimester abortions are five-to-ten times lower than
"' See Carhart, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1121.
102 See Stenberg, 120 S. C. at 2605.
'
03 See id.
" See Carhart, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1102 (citing the American Medical Association's
(AMA) "Report of the Board of Trustees on Late-Term Abortion"). (The Board of
Trustees prepared and submitted the report to the AMA's board of delegates in May,
1997, in response to the passage of a 1996 resolution by the delegates calling for the
AMA to conduct a study of late-term pregnancy termination techniques.); see also
Hope, 195 F.3d at 861.
10 See Carhart, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1102 (citingthe AMA Report).
1" See id.; see also Hope, 195 F.3d at 861 (the fetus is separated from the placenta ei-
ther by scraping or vacuum pressure, then is removed by suction.)
" See Carhart, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1102 (citingthe AMA Report).
0 See id. at 1103 (citingthe AMA Report).
'o9 See Stenberg; 120 S. CL at 2605 (citing S. GABBE, J. NIEBYL, & J. SmnsoN,
OBS=ETRICS: NOPMALAND PROBLEM PREGNANCIES 1253-54 (1996)).
20011
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those associated with carrying the fetus to term. ° Complication
rates are also low."' As the fetus grows in size, however, this
method of abortion becomes increasingly more difficult."' Dr.
Carhart claimed that he could no longer use this procedure
when the fetus reaches a gestational age of 15 weeks."
2. Dilation and Evacuation (D&E)
According to the AMA, the most common procedure for
inducing abortion in the early second trimester of pregnancy,
the thirteenth through fifteenth week of gestation, is dilation
and evacuation (D&E)Y" However, the D&E can be performed
through the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy with variations in
D&E operative strategy." 5 Common points for all D&E proce-
dures include (1) the dilation of the cervix; (2) the removal of
at least some fetal tissue using nonvacuum instruments; and (3)
after the fifteenth week, the potential need for instrument disar-
ticulation or dismemberment of the fetus or the collapse of the
fetal parts to facilitate evacuation from the uterus."6
Between thirteen and fifteen weeks of gestation, the D&E is
similar to the vacuum aspiration method, except that the cervix
must be dilated more widely because surgical instruments are
used to remove larger pieces of tissue." 7 A local anesthetic is of-
ten administered, and instruments are inserted through the
cervix into the uterus to remove fetal and placental tissue."' Be-
cause fetal tissue is easily broken at this stage of pregnancy, the
fetus is rarely removed intact."9 The walls of the uterus are then
1 See id.
". See id. See also Walther, supra note 68, at 698.
... See Walther, supra note 68, at 698.
"3 See Carhart, 11 F. Supp 2d at 1103.
See id. (citing the AMA Report).
,, See WARREN HERN, ABORTION PRACTICE 146-56 (1984).
116 See Sternberg, 120 S. Ct. at 2606; see also Hope, 195 F.3d at 861.
,11 See Stenberg, 120 S. Ct. at 2606. Osmotic dilators are usually used. Dr. Carhart
typically waits 12-72 hours before completing the abortion in order to allow for ade-
quate dilation. Often, in pregnancies beyond 14 weeks, oxytocin is given intrave-
nously to stimulate the uterus to contract and shrink. See Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F.
Supp. 2d 1099, 1101 (D. Neb. 1998) (citing the AMA Report).




scraped with a curette to ensure that no infection-causing tissue
remains.2
After fifteen weeks, the D&E can still be performed.' 2' How-
ever, because the fetus is larger at this stage of gestation, par-
ticularly the head, and because bones are more rigid,
dismemberment or other destructive procedures are more likely
to be required than at earlier gestational ages in order to re-
move fetal and placental tissue.'
Unlike the vacuum aspiration method, the D&E procedure
does carry certain risks.123 The use of instruments within the
uterus creates a danger of accidental perforation and damage to
neighboring organs. 24 Sharp fetal bone fragments create similar
dangers. And, because the fetus is rarely removed intact, fetal
tissue accidentally left behind can cause infection and various
other complications.1 26 Nonetheless, performing the D&E pro-
cedure between the twelfth and twentieth weeks of gestation is
significantly safer than performing the rarely used induced la-
bor procedures.
27
3. Dilation and Extraction (D&X)
There is a variation of the D&E procedure, commonly re-
ferred to as an "intact D&E." 't Like other versions of the D&E
procedure, the intact D&E begins with the induced dilation of
120See id.
121 See Stenbergv. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2606 (2000).
" See id. After the sixteenth week of gestation, Dr. Carhart uses the D&E proce-
dure combined with prostaglandin to aid in cervical dilation, along with other medi-
cations to cause the uterus to contract. Dr. Carhart inserts an instrument inside the
uterus, grabs a portion of the fetus, pulls it through the cervical os, and dismembers
various fetal parts by the traction created between the instrument and the cervical os.
The tearing of the fetal parts from the fetal body is accomplished by means of trac-
tion at the cervical os. As stated by Dr. Carhart, "[T]he dismemberment occurs be-
tween the traction of... my instrument and the counter-traction of the internal os of
the cervix." See Carhart, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1104.
12




' See Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2607 (2000)(caing D. NIcHOLS &
CLAIUXE-PEARSON, GYNECOLOGIC, OBSTETRIc, AND RELATED SURGERY (2000)).
12' See id. at 2607.
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the cervix.'2 The fetus is then removed from the uterus through
the cervix, while remaining intact (in one pass, rather than in
several passes) .13 The technique is used after sixteen weeks at
the earliest, when vacuum aspiration becomes ineffective be-
cause the fetal skull becomes too large to pass through the cer-
vix.' 3 ' The intact D&E can proceed in one of two ways,
depending on the presentation of the fetus.' 3 2 First, if the fetus
presents head first, the physician collapses the skull and then
extracts the entire fetus through the cervix. If the fetus pres-
ents feet first, however, the physician pulls the fetal body
through the cervix, then collapses the skull and extracts the fe-
tus.1'3 This second version of the intact D&E is commonly known
as the dilation and extraction method (D&X).'5
The D&X procedure, according to the AMA, may minimize
trauma to the woman's uterus, cervix, and other vital organs.""
Intact removal of the fetus minimizes the risk of damage to ma-
ternal structures from repeated use of instrumentation in the
uterine cavity. 3 7 Also, the intact removal of the fetus lowers ma-
ternal complications by preventing sharp fragments, such as
pieces of long bones or skull fragments, from passing through
the cervical os without some kind of covering or protection.
" See id; see also Hope, 195 F.3d at 861-62.
'3 See Stenberg, 120 S. Ct. at 2607.
131 See id.
132 see id.
J" See Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2607 (2000).
'3' See id. To collapse the fetal skull and evacuate its contents in order to pull it
through the cervical canal, the physician uses an instrument to either tear or perfo-
rate the skull to allow insertion of a suction tube and removal of the cranial contents.
Sometimes he will crush the skull, rather than pierce it. See Carhart, 11 F. Supp. 2d at
1106.
... See Carhart, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1105. The AMA describes the D&X as "deliberate
dilation of the cervix, usually over a sequence of days; instrumental conversion of the
fetus to a footlong breech; breech extraction of the body excepting the head; and
partial evacuation of the intracranial contents of a living fetus to effect vaginal deliv-
ery of a dead but otherwise intact fetus; see also Hope, 195 F.3d at 861-62.
See Carhart, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1107 (citing the AMA Report).
7 See id. The more times the physician must enter the uterus with an instrument,
the more likely it becomes that an injury to the uterus will occur. The D&X proce-
dure involves fewer insertions of forceps or other foreign objects into the uterus than
a D&E because in a D&X the fetus is removed intact.
' SeeCarhartv. Stenberg, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1107 (D. Neb. 1998).
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When the fetus is intact, its bones are covered by fetal tissue,
causing less trauma to the cervix.'39 Additionally, the D&X offers
a more accurate assessment of whether the uterine cavity has
been completely emptied. 4 Fetal and placental tissue or debris
left in the uterus, as is possible with a D&E involving dismem-
berment, can cause infection, greater bleeding, and risk of ab-
sorption of the fetal tissue into the maternal bloodstream."'
Finally, compression of the fetal skull, as performed in the
D&X, enables the physician to obtain as little cervical dilation as




An alternative to both D&E and D&X, labor induction may
also be used to induce abortion during the sixteenth to twenty-
fourth week of gestation. 43 Labor is induced by introducing a
hypertonic solution into the amniotic sac with the insertion of a
needle through the abdomen.' 4  The in ection causes fetal de-
mise and induces uterine contractions.' Over a period of sev-
eral hours, the contractions cause dilation of the cervix and
expulsion of the contents of the uterus.'46
Labor induction is a rarely used procedure and presents a
variety of problems. 47 The procedure can take over a week to
complete; women may have reactions to the drugs used during
1S9 See id.
1 See id.
"' See id. at 1104-05. Dr. Jane Hodgson, founder of the American College of Ob-
stetrics and Gynecology and author of 50 to 100 published articles on abortion, has
performed or supervised at least 30,000 abortions since 1973. Dr. Hodgson is quoted
as saying that, "leaving fetal parts in the uterus [is] a potentially 'horrible complica-
tion' that can cause infection and often results in perforation of the uterine wall by
bony splinters."
2 See Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1099 (D. Neb. 1998). In Dr.
Carhart's opinion, performing a D&X is much safer than performing a D&E that re-
sults in a dismembered fetus.








the procedure; and, a segment of the population cannot un-
dergo induction because of medical conditions like hyperten-
sion, heart disease, or diabetes. "8 Also, because this procedure
is similar to labor during a full-term delivery, it involves the
same complications, such as mild to severe abdominal pain,
fear, and lack of control.
49
5. Hysterotomy and Hysterectomy
Other abortion procedures available during the sixteenth
through twenty-fourth week of pregnancy are the rarely used
hysterotomy and hysterectomy. 5  Hysterotomy warrants major
surgery in which an incision is made into the abdomen and
uterine wall, from which the fetus and placenta are removed.'5'
And, hysterectomy is appropriate only in cases in which there is
a preexisting pathology.' 52 According to the AMA, maternal
mortality associated with these procedures is significantly
greater than those associated with the other techniques.1,3
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. Carhartv. Stenberg (1997)"
Dr. Leroy Carhart brought this lawsuit against the state of
Nebraska seeking a preliminary injunction concerning the en-
forcement of Nebraska's partial birth abortion law. 5  Dr.
Carhart claimed that the ban on partial birth abortions sub-
jected women seeking abortions to an appreciably greater risk
of injury or death than would be the case if Dr. Carhart was
permitted to perform partial birth abortions of nonviable fe-
tuses when he believed it medically necessary.16 Such a ban, he
argued, was an undue burden to women seeking abortions, and,
therefore, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
141 SeeCarhartv. Stenberg, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1108-09 (D. Neb. 1998).
, SeeWather, supra note 68, at 700.




G' Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1101 (D. Neb. 1998).
15 See id. at 1099.
See id. at 1120-21.
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Amendment.157 Dr. Carhart further argued that the statute was
unconstitutionally vague.,5'
Because the ban on partial birth abortions prohibited Dr.
Carhart's patients from choosing, with his advice, a safe and de-
sired method of terminating pregnancy before viability (the
D&X method),"" the court found the ban to be unconstitu-
tional. Specifically, the court found that the ban violated Dr.
Carhart's patients' Fourteenth Amendment Due Process right to
choose whether to terminate a pregnancy prior to viability.
The District Court further concluded that the statute pro-
hibited Dr. Carhart from using the standard D&E procedure,
impacting every woman who sought an abortion from Carhart
between the 16th and 20th week of pregnancy.";' According to
the District Court, the wording of the statute, fairly read, pro-
hibited the D&E procedure. Essentially, the ban prohibited
Carhart from employing the most widely-used abortion tech-
nique for approximately 190 women each year, making it an
undue burden.ee
The District Court further held the statute unconstitutional
on the basis of its vagueness. '  According to the opinion, any
criminal law, especially one banning protected constitutional
freedoms like abortion, that fails to give fair warning or that al-
lows arbitrary prosecution is void for vagueness. And, al-
though it is clear that the vaginal delivery of an arm or leg is a
substantial portion of a fetal body, it is unclear what more the
'15 See id.
See id. at 1121.
... See id. at 1123. The court concluded that the D&X procedure is appreciably
safer than all other forms of abortion during the relevant gestational time.
' See Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1127 (D. Neb. 1998).
161 See id.
'2 See id. at 1128. In sum, when using the D&E, the physician routinely dtsmem-
bers a leg or arm from a nonviable, yet living, fetus. In an) sensible and ordinary
reading of the word, a leg or arm is "substantial." The physical act of dismemberment
of this substantial portion of this intact fetus occurs partly in the vaginal cavity. The
physician deliberately intends that all of these events occur in order to perform the
D&E, a procedure the physician knows and deliberately intends %ill kill the nonviable
living fetus.
6 See id. at 1127.
See id. at 1131.
See id. at 1132.
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term "substantial portion" may mean.' The term "substantial
portion" is meaningless to doctors, lay people, and prosecutors
alike, rendering the entire statute void for vagueness and, there-
fore, unconstitutional. 67
2. Carhart v. Stenberg (1999)"
On appellate review, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the judg-
ment of the District Court.' Under the Nebraska partial birth
abortion statute, the court noted, a person is prohibited from
"deliberately and intentionally delivering into the vagina a living
unborn child, or a substantial portion thereof, for the purpose
of performing a procedure that the person performing such
procedure knows will kill the child.",170 The court explained that
although it had a duty to give the statute a construction that
would avoid any constitutional doubts, it could not twist the
words of the statute to give them a meaning they could not rea-
sonably bear.171 To that end, while the State argued that the
statute intended only to ban the D&X procedure, the court
concluded that the language of the statute described a proce-
dure which encompassed more than just D&X. 72  Specifically,
the Nebraska statute described a method of abortion that in-
cluded the D&E procedure.73
'66 SeeCarhartv. Stenberg, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1131 (D. Neb. 1998).
167 See id. at 1132.
'' Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142, 1151 (8th Cir. 1999).
169 See id. at 1152.
,70 Id. at 1150 (citing Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-326(9)).
171 See id.
172 See id.
173 See id. The crucial problem is the term "substantial portion," which is nowhere
defined in the statute. If "substantial portion" means an arm or a leg, which the
Court believed it does, then the ban on partial birth abortions encompasses both the
D&E and D&X procedures. The State defined the proscribed procedure as involving
the intentional (1) partial delivery of a living fetus vaginally; (2) killing the fetus; and
(3) completing the delivery. But, as the Court noted, the D&E procedure involves all
three of those steps. In a D&E, the physician intentionally brings a substantial part of
the fetus into the vagina, dismembers the fetus-leading to fetal demise-and com-
pletes the delivery. Additionally, in order to qualify as a partial birth abortion in Ne-
braska, the abortion must be performed by someone who knows that the procedure
"will kill the unborn child and does kill the unborn child." In the D&E, as in any
abortion procedure, the physician performing the procedure intends to kill the un-
born child and knows that the procedure will do so.
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Once the court determined that the Nebraska statute
banned the D&E procedure, as well as the D&X procedure, it
turned to the issue of whether such a ban imposed an undue
burden on women seeking second trimester abortions.'74 The
court cited Voinovich'75 for the proposition that any abortion
regulation that inhibits the vast majority of second trimester
abortions clearly has the effect of "placing a substantial obstacle
in the path of a woman seeking a pre-viability abortion." '76 Ac-
cordingly, because the Nebraska ban on partial birth abortions
encompassed the D&E procedure, the most commonly-used
second trimester abortion, it was again deemed an undue bur-
den on a woman's right to choose to terminate her pregnancy.'"
3. Stenberg v. Carhart (2000)
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari'78 on
January 14, 2000, to resolve the split among the circuits as to
whether state statutes banning partial birth abortions are consti-
tutional.
mH. SUMMARY OF THE OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
In an opinion written by Justice Breyer,'" the Supreme
Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit's holding that Nebraska's
statute banning partial birth abortion was unconstitutional.'-
" See id. at 1150-51.
" See Woman's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 201 (6th Cir. 1997).
The Voinovich Court based its reasoning on the Danforth holding. In Danforth, the
Court struck down the ban of the saline amniocentesis method of abortion because it
would inhibit the vast majority of abortions after the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, forc-
ing a woman to undergo a method of abortion more dangerous to her health. See
Danforth, 428 U.S. at 79. The Danforth Court's analysis, although based on the Roe
trimester framework, was consistent with Casey's undue burden standard, and there-
fore provided guidance on the issue of whether banning a particular and commonly
used method of abortion could constitute an undue burden.
" Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142, 1151 (8th Cir. 1999).
' See id.
'8 See Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2598 (2000).
'7' See id. at 2604. Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburgjoined Justice
Breyer in the majority opinion. Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion, in which
Justice Ginsburgjoined. Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion. Justice Gins-
burg filed a concurring opinion, in whichJustice Stevens joined.
'8 See id. at 2617.
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Following a thorough discussion of the different methods of
abortion currently available,' 8' the majority first concluded that
the Nebraska statute was unconstitutional because it lacked an Y
exception for the preservation of the health of the mother.'
Breyer noted that the decision in Casey reiterated the decision
in Roe that "subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its in-
terest in . . . human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even
proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medi-
cal judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother."
83
Therefore, the Court argued, since the law requires a health ex-
ception in order to validate a post-viability abortion, it, at a
minimum, requires the same with respect to pre-viability regula-
tion.18 4 After all, while states can regulate and even proscribe
post-viability abortions with no federal interference whatsoever,
in order to regulate pre-viability abortions, states are limited in
that they must first show that the regulation does not impose an
undue burden on the woman seeking the abortion." Further,
according to the Court, a risk to a woman's health is the same
whether it happens from regulating a particular method of
abortion, or from prohibiting abortion entirely 6 Thus, the
lack of a health exception in the Nebraska statute rendered it
unconstitutional. 87
While Nebraska responded that there is no need for a
health exception to the statute because safe alternatives remain
available and because a ban on partial birth abortions would
create no risks to the health of women, the Court disagreed.'88
In fact, the Court found that significant medical authority sup-
ports the proposition that in some circumstances, the D&X is
the safest method of abortion.t
181 See id. at 2605-2608. For a detailed description of the different abortion meth-
ods, see supra Part II(B).
See id at 2609.
" Id. See also Planned Parenthood of SE Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. at 879;
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (emphasis added).
181 See Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (2000). The state's interest in
regulating abortions pre-viability is considerably weaker than post-viability.
85 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 874.
186 See Stenberg, 120 S. Ct. at 2609.
187 See id.
1 See id. at 2610.
89 See id. The Court relied heavily on the medical evidence put forth in the District
Court opinion. On the basis of medical testimony, the District Court concluded that
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In response to the Court's findings, Nebraska put forth sev-
eral arguments.'9 0 First, the State asserted that the D&X proce-
dure is "little-used" and only by "a handful of doctors."'9 The
Court, however, deemed this argument irrelevant. 32 Even if the
D&X is infrequently used, the health exception question "is
whether protecting women's health requires an exception for
those infrequent occasions."' And, as the Court analogized, a
rarely-used treatment might be necessary to treat a rarely oc-
curring disease that could strike anyone; thus, the state could
not prohibit a person from obtaining the treatment "simply by
pointing out that most people do not need it."'9
Next, the State asserted that the D&E method of abortion
and labor induction are "safe alternative procedures."'" How-
ever, the District Court, relying on different expert testimony,
believed that although the D&E and labor induction methods
are safe, the D&X is significantly safer in certain circum-
stances. 96 The Supreme Court adopted the District Court's
opinion regarding this argument. 
97
Carhart's D&X procedure was safer than the D&E and other abortion procedures
during the relevant gestational period in the ten-to-twenty cases per year that pres-
ent to Carhart. See Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1126. Because the fetus is
passed through the cervix with a minimum of instrumentation, operating time, blood
loss, and risk of infection are reduced; there is less chance of complications from
bony fragments and instrument-inflicted damage to the uterus and cervix; and it
eliminates the possibility of complications arising from retained fetal parts. See rd.
Moreover, the District Court also noted that a select panel of American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists concluded that the D&X "may be the best or most
appropriate procedure in a particular circumstance to save the life or preserve the
health of the mother." Id at 1105, n. 10 (quoting American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists' statement of police on intact dilation and extraction).
1% See Stenberg, 120 S. C. at 2610-12.
11Id.
,92 See id. at 2611.
19 Id.
194 id.
'9- Id. at 2610.
" See id. at 2611. According to the AMA, statistical data suggests that the D&X
procedure is appreciably safer than all other forms of abortion during the relevant
gestational time. Maternal mortality rates for induced abortion procedures at 13
weeks' gestation or later in the United States between 1974-1987 %-ere (per 100,000
abortions): D&E-3.7 deaths; induction-7.1 deaths; hysterectomy/hysterotomy-
51.6 deaths. For the gestational period between the 16th and 20th week- D&E-6.5
deaths; induction-7.9 deaths; hysterectomy/hysterotomy-103.4 deaths. Moreover,
the risk of complications is as important as the mortality risk. The complication rate
for the D&E is only 7 per 1000, compared to between 21 and 25 per 1000 for induc-
tion procedures. A much greater risk is associated with other procedures such as hys-
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The State then put forth the argument that the ban would
not increase a woman's risk of several rare abortion complica-
tions.9  In response, the Court adopted the District Court's
findings once again and opined that the D&X actually reduces
the risk of complications during abortions.'9
The Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, as
amid supporting Nebraska, argued that elements of the D&X
may actually create special risks, including cervical incompe-
tence caused by overdilation.2 o In response to this argument,
the Court turned to the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists ("ACOG"), which denied that the D&X generally
poses greater risks than the alternatives. 21' The State also noted
that there are no medical studies establishing the safety of the
D&X procedure; the Court agreed with this assertion, but found
ACOG's assertion that D&X can be the most applicable proce-
dure to be persuasive.0 2
Finally, the State argued that the ACOG had qualified its
position that the D&X may be the "best or most appropriate
procedure" by adding that they could identify no particular cir-
cumstances under which the D&X would be the only option to
save the life or preserve the health of the mother.03 The Court
responded that although the ACOG was unable to identify a
specific circumstance in which the D&X would be the only op-
tion to save the life or preserve the health of the mother, it does
report that there is medical evidence that the D&X may at times
be a safer procedure than other available alternatives.
terectomies. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1116-17. Because the D&X is
essentially a variant of the D&E, there are no separate statistics comparing the D&E
and the D&X. However, Dr. Haskell has testified that his use of the D&X procedure
has resulted in no serious complications in approximately 1000 procedures, while out
of approximately 1000 D&E procedures, two patients had serious complications. See
Ann MacLean Massie, So-Called "Partial-Birth Abortion" Bans: Bad Medicine? Maybe. Bad
Law? Definitelyl, 59 U. Pin. L. REv. 301, 360 (Winter, 1998).
" SeeStenbergv. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2610-12 (2000).
. See id. at 2610.
' See id. at 2611.
See id. at 2610.
' See id. at 2611 (citing amici curiae Brief of American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, et aL at 23-24).
m See id.
03 See id.




In short, the Court responded to each argument, conclud-
ing that they were all insufficient to demonstrate that Ne-
braska's law needed no health exception. " *: Further, the Court
argued that the division of medical opinion about the matter
means, at most, uncertainty-a factor that signals the presence
of risk, not its absence.08 There are highly knowledgeable and
qualified experts on both sides of this issue, and where a signifi-
cant amount of medical opinion believes that a procedure may
expose unnecessary risk to some patients and has valid medical
reasons to support its view, the presence of a different view in it-
self does not prove the contrary.27 Because it is possible that the
absence of a health exception could place women at an unnec-
essary risk of tragic health consequences, the statute in question
must contain such an exception.
The next issue the majority addressed was whether the stat-
ute applied to the more commonly used D&E procedure, as well
as to the D&X procedure, thereby unduly burdening a woman
seeking a pre-viability abortion.' Concerning this issue, the
Court agreed with the Eighth Circuit that it did so apply.
2 1"
As the Court noted, even if the statute's basic aim was to ban
the D&X procedure only, its language made clear that it also
covered other procedures, and specifically, the D&E proce-
dure.211 Both procedures can involve the introduction of a sub-
stantial portion 12 of a still living fetus, through the cervix, into
the vagina.1 Although the Nebraska Attorney General argued
that the statutory term "substantial portion" mean "the child up
to the head," the Court refused to accept his interpretation, cit-
ing to Supreme Court precedent that the Court need not give
2" See id.
See id. at 2612-13.
'7 See id. at 2613.
2' See id. ("Nebraska has not convinced us that a health exception is 'never neces-
sary to preserve the health of a woman.'") (itingReply Brief for Petitioners at 4).
20"1 See id.
210 See id.
2" See id. at 2614.
212 See id. at 2613. The Court agreed with the District Court that an arm, a foot, or
a leg does, in fact, constitute a "substantial portion" of the fetus.
2' See id. at 2614.
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controlling weight to State Attorneys' General interpretive
views. 14
The next argument the Court struck down concerned the
statutory words' "partial delivery."21 5 Proponents of the statute
claimed that the introduction of merely a limb into the vagina
does not involve "delivery of the fetus," so the statutory words
could be read to exclude the D&E. 21 6 However, in response, the
Court argued that obstetric textbooks and even dictionaries rou-
tinely use the term "delivery" to describe any facilitated removal
of tissue from the uterus, not only the removal of an intact fe-
tus.
217
According to the Court, using this statute, some prosecutors
or future Attorneys' General may choose to bring action against
physicians who perform the D&E, the most commonly used
method for performing pre-viability abortions. 21  Thus, all phy-
sicians who perform second trimester abortions using the D&E
must fear prosecution.21 9 To that end, the statute imposed an
undue burden upon a woman's right to make an abortion deci-
sion and is, therefore, unconstitutional.
B. JUSTIGE STEVENS' CONCURRENCE
In a brief concurrence, 22 Justice Stevens explained that be-
cause the liberty guaranteed in the Fourteenth amendment en-
compasses a woman's right to choose abortion, the state has no
legitimate interest in requiring the physician performing the
abortion to follow any procedure other than the one the physi-
cian believes will be in the best interests of the mother.22 Addi-
tionally, Justice Stevens pointed out that both the D&E and
D&X procedures are equally gruesome and are performed at a
214 See id.
.. See id. at 2616.
216 See id.
217 See id.
218 See id. at 2617.
219 See id.
22 See id.
" See id. (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburgjoined injustice Stevens' con-
currence.
22 See id. (Stevens,J., concurring).
[Vol. 91
STENBERG V. CARHART
late stage of gestation; banning one but not the other, there-
fore, is irrational.2
C. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S CONCURRENCE
Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence, echoed the reason-
ing of the Majority opinion. First, she argued that the Nebraska
statute was irreconcilable with Casey because it lacked an excep-
tion for the preservation of the health of the mother.2' Further,
O'Connor argued that medical evidence had established that
the statute banned the D&E, as well as the D&X procedure,
thereby unduly burdening a woman's right to choose abor-
tion.225
Unlike the majority opinion, however, Justice O'Connor
touched on the issue of similar statutes from other states that
are more narrowly drawn to proscribe the D&X procedure
alone. If the Nebraska statute limited its application to the
D&X procedure alone and included an exception for the life
and the health of the mother, Justice O'Connor opined, the
question presented to the Supreme Court in this case would be
very different.2 However, she offered no indication of what the
resolution would be.
D. JUSTICE GINSBURG'S CONCURRENCE
In the final concurrence, Justice Ginsburge emphasized the
fact that any ban on partial birth abortions does not save any fe-
tus from destruction, as it targets only a method of performing
See id. (Stevens,J., concurring).
2" See id. at 2618. (O'Connor,J., concurring).
See id. at 2619. (O'Connor,J., concurring).
See id. (O'ConnorJ., concurring). Some of those statutes have done so by spe-
cifically excluding from their coverage the most common methods of abortion. For
example, the Kansas statute states that its ban does not apply to the "(A) suction cu-
rettage abortion procedure; (B) suction aspiration abortion procedure; or (C) dila-
tion and evacuation abortion procedure involving dismemberment of the fetus prior
to removal from the body of the pregnant woman." The Utah statute similarly pro-
vides its prohibition "does not include the dilation and evacuation procedure involv-
ing dismemberment prior to removal, the suction curettage procedure, or the suction
aspiration procedure for abortion."
See id. (O'ConnorJ., concurring).




abortion.2 2 Nor does the statute seek to protect the health of
lives of women. 20 Rather, bans on partial birth abortions "seek
to chip away at the private choice shielded by Roe v. Wade, even
as modified by Casey."
23
1
E. CHIEFJUSTICE REHNQUIST'S DISSENT
In a very brief dissent, ChiefJustice Rehnquist reminded the
Court that he dissented from the Casey opinion and still does
not agree with its holding.232 He then stated his belief that Jus-
tices Kennedy and Thomas correctly applied the Casey princi-
ples in their dissents, and he simplyjoined in their opinions.
233
F. JUSTICE SCALIA'S DISSENT
Justice Scalia, in his dissent, first touched on the issue of
whether the ban on partial birth abortions encompassed more
than the D&X procedure.23 Without much discussion, Justice
Scalia simply concluded that the Majority had abandoned the
long-standing principle that ambiguously worded statutes
should always be read to avoid constitutional challenge. 35
He then discussed the subjective nature of the "undue bur-
den" test, claiming that it is in reality a value judgment, de-
pendent upon how much one respects (or believes society
ought to respect) the life of the fetus, and how much one re-
spects (or believes society ought to resject) the freedom of the
woman who gave it life to 
terminate it.
Justice Scalia concluded his dissent by suggesting that the
Court had involved itself in politics, as opposed to interpreting
the Constitution.237 He argued that the Court should not be in
the abortion umpiring business, but rather should leave the is-
sue for the people to decide.ss
22 See iL (Ginsburg,J., concurring).
See id. (Ginsburg,J., concurring).
23 Id. (Ginsburg,J., concurring).
232 See id. at 2620. (Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
's See id. at 2621. (RehnquistJ., dissenting).
See id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
2" See id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
' See id. at 2622. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
27 See id. at 2622-23 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
See id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
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G. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S DISSENT
Justice Kennedy began his dissent by graphically describing
the way in which a fetus is terminated during both a D&E abor-
tion2s9 and a D&X abortion.2 40 He then argued that in reaching
its decision in this case, the Majority misunderstood Casey.24' He
claimed that the main premise of Casey was that states were
granted an important constitutional role in defining their inter-
ests in the abortion debate, 42 and that although Nebraska put
forth a number of legitimate interests in banning partial birth
abortions,243 the Court simply ignored them.21  Although the
Court was unable to distinguish the D&E from the D&X in
terms of scientific means, Justice Kennedy noted that the state of
Nebraska had a right to recognize a moral difference between
the two procedures.2  In a D&X, the fetus is killed outside the
womb and, therefore, bears a closer resemblance to infanticide,
which could present a greater disrespect for human life and a
consequent greater risk to the medical profession and society.11
For this reason, Justice Kennedy argued, the holding in this case
is irreconcilable with Casey's assurance that the states interest in
promoting respect for life is "more than marginal."4'
Concerning the Majority's argument that the Nebraska stat-
ute was unconstitutional because it lacked a health exception,
Justice Kennedy's response was simply that there have been no
studies that support the contention that the D&X abortion
29 See Stenberg, 120 S. CL at 2624 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). (The fetus, in many
cases, dies just as a human adult or child would; it bleeds to death as it is torn from
limb to limb (referring to the D&E procedure).")
2" See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). ("Witnesses report observing the portion of
the fetus outside the woman react to the skull penetration.")
2" See id. at 2625 (Kennedy,J., dissenting).
2 See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Casey held that cases decided under the tri-
mester framework established in Roe had given state interests too little acknowledg-
ment. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 873.
24' See Stenberg, 120 S. Ct. at 2625 (KennedyJ., dissenting). States have an interest
in forbidding medical procedures that might cause medical professionals or even so-
ciety as a whole to become insensitive, even disdainful, to life. Or, a state might have
an interest in ensuring that their medical professionals are viewed as healers, and not
killers.
21 See id. (Kennedy,J., dissenting).
' See id. at 2626 (KennedyJ, dissenting).
246 See id. (Kennedy,J., dissenting).
247Seeid. at2627-28 (Kennedy,J., dissenting).
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method is any safer than other available abortion methods.48
With that noted, Justice Kennedy referred back to the Casey de-
cision requiring that a regulation impose a significant threat to
the life or health of a woman before its application imposed an
undue burden.249  He argued that unsubstantiated marginal
health differences, does not amount to a significant threat to
the life or health of the mother and, therefore, cannot consti-
tute a substantial obstacle to the abortion right.2 0
Further, Justice Kennedy opined that if the health of the
mother is put to the discretion of the doctor, the health of the
mother standard is basically eviscerated.25' Any doctor could say
that any procedure is necessary for the health of the mother.
This, according to Justice Kennedy, is the vice of a health excep-
tion resting in the physician's discretion. 3 He suggested that
254this standard must be reigned in.
Next, Justice Kennedy tackled the issue of whether the stat-
ute proscribed both the D&X and the D&E procedure. First, he
explained that the term "partial birth abortion" is consistently
associated with the D&X procedure. 5 He next addressed the
true meaning of the word "delivery, 25 6 claiming that there is no
delivery in the D&E procedure, excluding it from the ban on
partial birth abortions. Justice Kennedy argued that the Ma-
2148 See id. at 2628 (KennedyJ, dissenting).
249 See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Planned Parenthood of SE Penn. v. Ca-
sey, 505 U.S. 833, 880 (1992).
' See Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2628-29 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissent-
ing).
25' See id. at 2631 (Kennedy,J., dissenting).
22 See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). ("A ban which depends on the 'appropriate
medical judgment' of Dr. Carhart is no ban at all.")
"See id& (KennedyJ, dissenting).
" See id (Kennedy,J., dissenting).
2" See id. at 2632 (KennedyJ, dissenting). Dr. Carhart's own leading expert pref-
aced his description of the D&X by describing it as the procedure which, in the lay
press, has been called a partial birth abortion. And, the AMA has declared that par-
tial birth abortion legislation is by its name aimed exclusively at the D&X procedure.
2" See Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2632. (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
("Only removal of an intact fetus can be described as a "delivery" of a fetus and only
the D& X involves an intact fetus.")
" See id. (KennedyJ, dissenting). In a D&E, portions of the fetus are pulled into
the vagina with the intention of dismembering the fetus by using the traction at the
opening between the uterus and vagina; this cannot be considered a delivery of a por-
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jority, in reaching its holding, ignored the settled rule against
deciding unnecessary constitutional questions by concluding
that the Nebraska statute encompassed more than the D&X
method of abortion258
H. JUSTICE THOMAS'S DISSENT
Justice Thomas began his lengthy dissent 9 with the recogni-
tion of the Court's acknowledgment in Casey that states have a
legitimate role in regulating abortion and that states have an in-
terest in respecting fetal life at all stages of development.2w He
continued to argue that if the Nebraska statute was unconstitu-
tional under Casey, then Casey meant nothing at all. 5"
Similar to the Majority opinion, Justice Thomas, in his dis-
sent, offered detailed descriptions of all available abortion pro-
cedures.262  He then addressed the issue of statutory
interpretation and whether the Nebraska statute included a
prohibition of the D&E method of abortion. Like Justice Ken-
nedy, Justice Thomas found his answer in the term "delivery.
" 240
When read in context, the term "partial delivery," according to
Justice Thomas, cannot be fairly interpreted to include remov-
ing pieces of an unborn child from the uterus one at a time.'
Additionally, according to Justice Thomas, the wording of
the statute made it clear that the procedure that kills the fetus
must be separate and apart from the "partial delivery into the
vagina" of "a living unborn child or substantial portion
thereof."2 65 However, in a D&E, the physician does not "deliver"
tion of a fetus. In Dr. Carhart's own words, the D&E "leaves the abortionist with a
tray full of pieces."
See id. at 2634.
"Justice Thomas was joined in his dissent by ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia.
' See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. justice Thomas
further points out that although in his decision he adheres to the undue burden
standard previously set forth by the Court, he makes it known that he disagreed
strongly with the Casey holding. See Stenberg, 120 S. Ct. at 2634.
"' SeeStenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2637 (2000) (ThomasJ., dissenting).
22 See id. at 2637-40 (Thomas, J., dissenting). For a thorough discussion of these
procedures, see supra Part III(B).
21 See Stenberg 120 S. CL at 2640 (Thomas,J., dissenting).
See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). ("Without question, one does not deliver a
child when one removes the child from the uterus piece by piece, as in a D&E.")
2sSee id. at 2641 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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the child before performing the death-causing procedure be-
cause the dismemberment "delivery" is in itself the act that
causes the fetus's death. 266 And, Justice Thomas did not agree
that removing a limb from the uterus would constitute a "sub-
stantial portion" of the fetus.
267
Like the other dissenters, Justice Thomas also noted that
the AMA and other medical authorities have equated the term
"partial birth abortion" with the D&X procedure, and that sev-
eral lower courts have acknowledged that "partial birth abor-
tion" is commonly understood to mean D&X.2" However,
Justice Thomas, unlike the other dissenters, included the fact
that "partial birth abortion" has been twice used by Congress,
which described the procedure as separate and distinct from the
D&E. 26 Finally, as Justice Thomas argued, were there any
doubts as to the whether the plain language of the statute could
apply to the D&E procedure, the Court was bound to consider
whether a construction of the statute that would avoid constitu-
tional challenge was available;
2 70 in this case, there was.2
71
Justice Thomas then attacked the Majority's speculation that
a Nebraska prosecutor or future Attorney General may attempt
to stretch the statute to apply it to the D&E procedure. A
statute cannot be deemed unconstitutional on its face merely
because one can imagine an aggressive prosecutor who would
21
attempt an overly aggressive application of the statuteY. The
Court is not in the business of giving statutes the broadest defi-
nition imaginable.274 Rather, as Justice Thomas, noted, the
Court should ask whether the "ordinary person exercising ordi-
"See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
26 See id. (ThomasJ., dissenting).
m See id. at 2642 (ThomasJ, dissenting).
69See idat 2643. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
270 See Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2644 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
The term substantial portion was susceptible to a narrowing construction that would
exclude the D&E procedure. Or, a Court could construe "for the purpose of per-
forming a procedure" to mean "for the purpose of performing a separate procedure."
27 See id.
272 See id. at 2647 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
' See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
274 See id. (ThomasJ., dissenting).
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nary common sense can sufficiently understand and comply
with the statute."m
Turning to the question of whether the Nebraska statute is
unconstitutional based on its lack of any exception for the pres-
ervation of the health of the mother, Justice Thomas again re-
ferred to Casey. 6  As he concluded, the ruling in Casey,
requiring an exception for the health of the mother, addressed
only those situations in which a woman must obtain an abortion
because of some threat to her health from continued preg-
nancy.2" However, Casey mentioned nothing at all about cases
in which a physician considered one prohibited method of
abortion to be preferable to permissible methods. "7 Justice
Thomas opined that the Majority opinion twisted the Casey
health exception to apply to a situation in which a woman de-
sires, for whatever reason, an abortion and wishes to obtain the
abortion by some particular method.2 Simply stated, the Ma-
jority failed to distinguish between cases in which health con-
cerns require a woman to obtain an abortion and cases in which
health concerns cause a woman who desires an abortion to pre-
fer one method over another.80
Justice Thomas then supportedJustice Kennedy's argument
that if the health of the mother is put into the discretion of the
doctor, the health of the mother standard is eviscerated.2' Any
doctor could say that any procedure is necessary for the health
of the mother. 2 Just because a procedure has some compara-
tive health benefits does not make it a "necessary" procedure.2
The broad health exception would impose unfettered abortion-
on-demand because there will always be some physicians who
conclude that some procedure is preferable.2
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l
Ass'n, of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 579 (1973)).
' SeeStenberg v.Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2651 (2000) (ThomasJ., dissenting).
'See id. (Thomas,J., dissenting).
See id. (ThomasJ, dissenting).
"See id. (Thomas,J, dissenting).
mSee id. at 2652. (Thomas,J., dissenting).
See id (Thomas,J., dissenting).
SeeStenbergv.Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597 (2000). (Thomas,J, dissenting).
'See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).




In Carhart, the Court correctly held that the Nebraska stat-
ute banning partial birth abortions was unconstitutional."" The
holdings in Roe and Casey make it clear that any abortion regula-
tion must have an exception for the preservation of the life or
the health of the mother;286 the statute at issue did not.287 Fur-
ther, the statutory language and legislative history of the statute
in question support the Court's conclusion that the D&E, as well
as the D&X, method of abortion was banned, imposing an un-
due burden on any woman seeking a pre-viability abortion.
2 88
Although correct, the Carhart holding was incomplete and
unsatisfactory. Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence, touched
on the concept of analyzing a statute narrowly tailored to pro-
scribe only the D&X method of abortion and including an ex-
ception for the preservation of the health of the mother.' 9 The
Court, however, neglected to address this issue.290 By first ad-
dressing (1) whether the lack of a health exception in this par-
ticular statute rendered it unconstitutional, and (2) whether the
D&E was included in the ban, the Court did not have the op-
portunity to reach the issue of whether a ban of the D&X pro-
cedure, in itself, would constitute an undue burden. The Court
should have declared a broader holding on the constitutionality
of banning partial birth abortions, concluding that even a ban
on the D&X procedure alone would constitute an undue bur-
den.2
A. THE COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE LACK OF A
HEALTH EXCEPTION IN THE NEBRASKA STATUTE RENDERED IT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
In order to be deemed constitutional, abortion restrictions
must contain adequate provisions to preserve a woman's life and
2" See id. at 2617.
2 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 879.
287 See Stenberg, 120 S. Ct. at 2620. (O'Connor,J., concurring).
.. See id. at 2617.
211 See id. at 2619.
See id.
"' See Walther, supra note 68, at 695.
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health, even post-viability. 2  And, an adequate life and health
provision must cover not only situations where the woman is fac-
ing physical harm, but also situations where a woman is faced
with the risk of severe psychological or emotional injury that
may be irreversible. 3 In a medical emergency requiring quick
responses to rapidly changing circumstances, allowing the at-
tending physician the discretion to use the full range of treat-
ment options is particularly crucial.m The Nebraska statute,
however, contained no such health exception, rendering it un-
constitutional.2 5
The wording of the relevant phrase in Casey is that the state
can regulate, and even proscribe, abortion, "except when neces-
sary, in appropriate medical judgent, for the preservation of
the life of health of the mother." As the Supreme Court con-
cluded, the term "necessary" cannot refer only to absolute ne-
cessity or to absolute truth, as medical treatments and
procedures are often considered appropriate (or not) in light of
estimated comparative health risks (or benefits) in particular
cases. 7 Further, the phrase cannot require absolute unanimity
of medical opinion-doctors often differ in their estimation of
comparative health risks and appropriate treatment.2 In this
instance, both the petitioner and respondent have adequate
and reliable medical opinions about the necessity (or lack
thereof) of the D&X procedure. However, as the Court
noted, this uncertainty signals the possible presence of risk."" If
the D&X truly is the safest abortion method in some circum-
stances, the absence of a health exception will -place women at
an unnecessary risk of health consequences. If, however,
2
9See Roe, 404 U.S. at 164-65; see also Case, 505 U.S. at 879-80; see also Thornburgh.
supra note 38, at 768-69.
29 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882 ("It cannot be questioned that psychological well-being
is a facet of health.").
See Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, supra note 201, at 28-29.
2 See Stenberg, 120 S. Ct. at 2620.
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 879.
2nSeeStenberg, 120 S. C. at 2612
See id.
See Brief of Respondent, at 32-34, Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597 (2000)
(No. 99-830); but see Brief of Petitioners, at 35-47, Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597
(2000) (No. 99-830).
5" See Carhart, 120 S. Ct. at 2612-13.
"' See id. at 2613.
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other methods of abortion are equally as safe, or even safer, the
exception will merely turn out to be unnecessary. 12
In response to the argument of Justices Thomas and Ken-
nedy that, if able, a physician would perform the D&X proce-
dure for reasons other than the health of the mother, such as
financial gain,s33 it is highly unlikely. The D&X method requires
less time than techniques which induce labor and, unlike most
induction methods, the D&X can be performed on an outpa-
tient basis.3° The D&X, therefore, entails less expense to the pa-
tient and, consequently, less financial gain to the attending
physician.05 Furthermore, we must and do presume that a phy-
sician will do only what is in her patient's best interests.
30 6
The statute's narrow life exception, permitting the physi-
cian to perform the banned procedure only if it is necessary to
save the life of the mother,0 7 is wholly inadequate. First, the life
exception ignores the essential issue of mental and/or psycho-
logical illness, as discussed in Casey.s00 The psychological benefit
of seeing and even holding an intact fetus is an advantage the
patient realizes by choosing the D&X method.39 At a Hearing
before the House of Representatives concerning this issue, a
woman spoke about her experience with the D&X method of
abortion:
Thanks to the [D&X] procedure that Dr. McMahon uses in terminating
these pregnancies, we got to hold her and be with her and love her and
have pictures for a couple of hours, which was wonderful and heart-
'02 See id.
3 0 See id. at 2652 (Thomas,J, dissenting). ("If the health of the mother is put into
the discretion of the doctor, the health of the mother standard is essentially eviscer-
ated.")
0' See Massie, supra note 196, at 360. Abortions by induction are primarily per-
formed in hospital settings. See Carhart v. Stenberg, II F. Supp. 2d, 1099, 1109. (D.
Neb. 1998).
-" See Massie, supra note 196, at 360.
30 See 1 HIPPOcRATES, WoRxs 299-301 (Francis Adams trans., New York, Loeb)
available at <http://www.hIumanities.ccny.cuny.edu/hlistoly/reader/hippoatli.htm> ("I swear.
. I will follow that system of regimen which, according to my ability and judgment, I
consider for the benefit of my patients, and abstain from whatever is deleterious and
mischievous... into whatever houses I enter, I will go into them for the benefit of the
sick, and will abstain from any voluntary act of mischief and corruption.").
"7 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-328(1).
" SeePlanned Parenthood of SE Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992).
' See Massie, supra note 196, at 317. See also Casey, 505 U.S. at 882 ("It cannot be
questioned that psychological well-being is a facet of health.").
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breaking all at once. They had her wrapped in a blanket. We s ent
some time with her, said our goodbyes, and went back to the hotel.
Further, genetic testing, useful for tracing the source of fe-
tal abnormalities and in helping a couple's future family plan-
ning, is also possible when the fetus is intact, allowing for
psychological comfort to the woman.3"
Additionally, the life exception of the statute would chill
physicians from life-saving care. Even physicians who act in
good faith in a medical emergency, believing that the only way
to save the life of the mother is to perform a "partial birth abor-
tion," will risk imprisonment and loss of their license if their de-
cisions are later second-guessed.3 '3 Dr. Warren Hem, 3 4 at a
Senate Hearing, emphasized the importance of according phy-
sicians the right to make professional judgments based on their
expertise, particularly in on-the-spot situations:
While I may choose a different method of performing a late abortion, I
support the right of my medical colleagues to use whatever methods they
deem appropriate to protect the woman's safety during this difficult
procedure. It is simply not possible for others to second-guess the sur-
geon's judgment in the operating room. That would be dangerous and
unacceptable .... [When I was forced to act quickly to perform abor-
tions in order to save women's lives], Mr. Chairman, I did not have time
to consult the United States Senate on the proper method of performing
the abortions. 314
3,0 Partial-Birth Abortion: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution
of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 64, 72 (1995) (statement of
Tammy Watts).
" See id. at 75. "If I can keep one family from going through what we went
through, it would make her life have some meaning. So, they're doing the testing
now. And because Dr. McMahon does the procedure the vwy he does, it made the
testing possible."
2 See Brief of Amici Curiae in support of Respondent, supra note 201, at 29-30.
313 see id.
s,' Dr. Warren Hem, M.D., M.P.H., Ph.D., is the Director of the Boulder, Colo-
rado, Abortion Clinic and a Clinical Professor in the Obstetrics and Gynecology De-
partment at the University of Colorado Health Sciences Center in Denver. He is also
the author of Abortion Practice, the principle medical textbook on abortion proce-
dures, and a well-known authority on the subject, as he specializes in difficult, late-
term abortions. See Massie, supra note 196, 335, 373
314 Massie, supra note 196, at 373. (citing The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of




The statute hinders a physician's ability to provide her pa-
tents with the best medical care. Because the statute could
force a woman whose health is threatened by her pregnancy to
choose between undergoing an abortion more dangerous to her
health than the D&X procedure1 6 and continuing her preg-
nancy in the face of potentially serious health risks, the statute is
irreconcilable with the holding in Casey.317 It is, therefore, un-
constitutional.3 8
Justice Thomas's argument that the health exception, as re-
affirmed in Casey, extends only to women who seek abortions for
health-related concerns, and not to women who seek abortions
for non-health-related issues, but desire one method of abortion
over another due to health concerns, 3 9 is a misreading of Casey.
In Casey, the Court specifically asserted that the only issue at
stake under the "undue burden" regime is the woman's right to
make the ultimate decision whether to terminate her preg-
nancy.3 0 Hence, if a woman desires an abortion but decides not
to get one because of health concerns from a particular method,
those health concerns would serve as a substantial obstacle to
her decision whether to abort her pregnancy.12 This, as definedin Casey, constitutes an undue burden. 2
B. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
STATUTE INDICATE THAT THE BAN INCLUDED THE D&E
PROCEDURE, AS WELL AS THE D&X PROCEDURE, THEREBY UNDULY
BURDENING A WOMAN'S RIGHT TO CHOOSE A PREVIABILITY
ABORTION
Although the State and the dissenters argued that the am-
biguous wording of the statute should have forced the Court to
315 See id.
16 See Brief of Amici Curiae in support of Respondent, supra note 201, at 29-30. If a
hysterotomy or hysterectomy would preserve the health of a woman, the Nebraska
statute would require the physician to resort to those procedures, even though they
present far greater risks to the woman's health and future fertility than the banned
procedures. Id.
317 See id. at 29.
318 See id.
"9 SeeStenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2651 (2000) (Thomas,J, dissenting).





interpret the statute in a way to avoid constitutional challenge, 23
the Eighth Circuit was correct in stating that, "it could not twist
the words of the statute to give them a meaning they cannot
reasonably bear."324 The statute is impermissibly vague. And,
contrary to the State's assertion that "no reasonable person"
could interpret the Act as applying to the D&E procedure,3 6 all
of the federal judges for the Court of Appeals3  and five Su-
preme Court Justices12s actually determined that the statute did
ban the D&E procedure. Because the Courts, the plaintiffs, and
the defendants failed to agree on the meaning of the terms, nei-
ther can ordinary people understand their meaning)5 At the
very least, therefore, the statute is impermissibly vague.
The main reason for the vagueness is the use of the term
"substantial portion" in the statutory definition of partial birth
abortion 3 ° "[T] his term could be interpreted in vastly different
ways by fair-minded people." 3' For instance, Dr. Carhart be-
lieves that the term "substantial portion" could mean any identi-
fiable part of the fetus, including the umbilical cord, a foot, a
finger, or a portion of the skull.3 - Dr. Stubblefield testified that
the meaning of "substantial portion" was subject to opinion be-
cause "there is no legal or medical definition of what constitutes
a substantial portion of an unborn child."3  He further testified
2 See Stenberg, 120 S. Cr- at 2634 (Kennedy,J., dissenting).
324 See Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142, 1150 (8th Cir. 1999).
3- See Brief of Amici Curiae in support of Respondent, supra note 201, at 9-10.
See Brief of Petitioners, supra note 299, at 15.
'v See Carhar 192 F.3d at 1150 ("The language of [the statute] describes a method
of abortion that includes the D&E procedure, and the intent requirement of the stat-
ute does not work to protect physicians who perform the D&E procedure from violat-
ing the statute. [The statute] not only prohibits the D&X procedure, but the D&E
procedure as well.").
3 See Stenberg, 120 S. CL at 2609 ("[The statute] imposes an undue burden on a
woman's ability to choose a D&E abortion, thereby unduly burdening the right to
choose abortion itself.").
s See Susan Michelle Gerling, Recent Development: Vriginia s Partial Bwrth Abortzon
Statute: An Unconstitutional Restriction on a Woman's Right to Have an AbortXon, 55 WASH.
U.J. URB. & CONTmiP. L. 275, 295 (Winter, 1999).
See Neb. Rev. Star. § 28-326(9) (2000).
3' Brief of Amici Curiae in support of Respondent, supra note 201, at 11 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
32 See Carhart, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1118 (D. Neb. 1998).
Id. Dr. Stubblefield is a professor and chairman of the Department of Obstet-
rics and Gynecology at the Boston University School of Medicine. See zd. at 1109.
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that if it means just more than a little bit of the fetus, the statute
would be precluding most surgical abortions. 34 Dr. Riegel be-
lieves that a "substantial portion" means "probably over 50 per-
cent of the size [of the fetus] . . .. It's a vague term." "5  Dr.
Boehm reads "substantial portion" to mean more than a hand
or a leg.336 Specifically, Dr. Boehm believes, "I'm not sure that I
can define that, but I don't think anyone has or could.
'33 7
There are even numerous and conflicting explanations of the
term in the statute's legislative history.338 Unless physicians are
given clear guidance about how much of a fetus can legally be
removed from the woman's uterus before triggering the statute,
they will be unable to conform their conduct appropriately.
39
Moreover, the variety of definitions of "substantial portion" are
"fodder for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement" of the
statute.m° And, as the Eighth Circuit noted, if "substantial por-
tion" can mean an arm or a leg, then the ban clearly encom-
passes both the D&E and the D&X procedures. 4'
Additionally, the dissenters' argument that the statutory
term "partially delivers" excludes the D&E procedure from the
' See id. at 1118.
.. Id. Dr. Riegel is an obstetrician, gynecologist, and infertility specialist. See id. at
1113.
' See id. at 1119. Dr. Boehm is board-certified in obstetrics and gynecology and
maternal fetal medicine and has practiced in those areas since 1996. See id. at 1114.
...Id. at 1119.
"' See Brief of Respondent, supra note 299, at 49-50. After stating that the term
"substantial portion" could be easily defined, Senator Maurstad, a proponent of the
statute, stated, "one-third of a fetus could be a substantial portion;" "one-fourth could
be, depending on which fourth;" and "substantial portion would be subjective." He
also agreed that "as small a portion of the fetus as a foot would constitute a substantial
portion ... as would a fetal hand." In fact, Senator Maurstad plainly acknowledged
that dismembering the fetus after "more than a little bit" of it had been delivered into
the vagina would violate the statute. Other senators, supporting the statute, were
confused by the term, "substantial portion." One senator stated, "I would assume...
substantial would mean a significant portion of that child;" another senator simply
stated, "I think it would be difficult [for a physician reading the statute to understand
what was meant by the words 'substantial portion']." Id at 6 (citations omitted).
... See id. at 49-50.
4 0
.d
See Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142, 1150 (8th Cir. 1999). In the D&E pro-
cedure, the physician often inserts forceps into the uterus, grasps a part of the living
fetus, and pulls that part of the fetus through the cervix. That part of the fetus is usu-
ally the arm or the leg.
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ban342 is invalid. As the Court noted, obstetric textbooks and
even dictionaries use the term "delivery" to describe any facili-
tated removal of tissue from the uterus, not only the removal of
an intact fetus.m
Once again, as the Eighth Circuit noted, although the Court
has a duty to give the statute a construction that would avoid any
constitutional doubts, it cannot twist the words of the statute to
give them a meaning that they could not bear.3" Because, as Dr.
Stubblefield testified, there is no legal or medical definition as
to what constitutes a "substantial portion" of an unborn child,M"
the Court is essentially unable to construct a meaning for the
term in order to give the statute a more narrow reading. Thus,
the statute is unconstitutionally vague.
By prohibiting multiple methods of abortion, including the
most commonly used procedure for second-trimester, previabil-
ity abortions (the D&E method), the statute succeeded in im-
posing an undue burden on women seeking abortions.mG The
Court in Casey declared that any regulation placing a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking a previability abortion
would constitute an "undue burden."3 " The statute at issue pre-
cludes a woman from consulting with her physician in an effort
to choose the most appropriate and safest abortion procedure
for her particular circumstances, forcing the woman and her
physician to consider terminating her pregnancy by methods
more dangerous to her health than the method outlawed.4
Because the statute can be read to ban D&E procedures of all
varieties, which account for more than ninety percent of post-
first-trimester abortions performed in the United States, it
' See Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. CL 2597, 2616. The dissenters claim that the in-
troduction of a limb or even of both limbs into the vagina does not constitute a 'de-
livery." See id.
mSee id. (citing OBsrEmcs: NORtAL & PROBEMI PREGNANCIES 388 (describing "de-
livery" of fetal membranes, placenta, and umbilical cord in the third stage of labor);
B. MALOy, MEDICALDICtIONARY FOR LAWvYfRS 221 (3d. ed. 1960) ('Also, the removal of
a [fetal] part such as the placenta [constitutes delivery].")).
See Carhar 192 F.3d at 1150.
See Carhart, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1118 (D. Neb. 1998).
See Stenberg, 120 S. CL at 2617.
?17 See Planned Parenthood of SE Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
'" See Brief of Amici Curiae in support of Respondent, supra note 201, at 18.
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places a substantial obstacle in the path of the woman seeking
the abortion, rendering the statute unconstitutional.349
C. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE DECLARED A BROADER
HOLDING ON THIS ISSUE, CONCLUDING THAT EVEN A BAN ON THE
D&X PROCEDURE ALONE WOULD CONSTITUTE AN UNDUE BURDEN
By first addressing the issues of whether the lack of a health
exception and the unconstitutionally vague wording of the stat-
ute rendered it unconstitutional, the Court was unable to reach
an answer to the ultimate question-if a statute is narrowly tai-
lored to proscribe only the D&X procedure, as the State con-
tends that this statute is, and includes a valid health exception,
will such a ban impose an undue burden on a woman seeking
an abortion?350 Undoubtedly, this question will be presented to
multiple lower courts, and presumably it will reach the Supreme
Court once again.
Banning the D&X procedure, in itself, would create an un-
due burden on women by forcing them to choose alternative
procedures to the D&X, or no procedure at all, if she believes
her health would be in danger. Depending on the physician's
skill and experience, the D&X procedure can be the most ap-
propriate abortion procedure for some women in certain cir-
cumstances.' 2 The D&X presents a variety of potential safety
advantages over other abortion procedures used during the
same gestational period.53 Compared to D&E procedures in-
volving dismemberment, the D&X involves less risk of uterine
perforation or cervical laceration because it requires the physi-
cian to make fewer passes into the uterus with sharp instruments
and reduces the presence of sharp fetal bone fragments that can
injure the uterus and cervix. 54 There is also considerable evi-
dence that the D&X reduces the risk of retained fetal tissue, a
serious abortion complication that can cause maternal death.3 5
'4 See id.; see also Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
79 (1976) (holding unconstitutional a ban on saline amniocentesis, then the most
common method of post-first-trimester abortions).
See Stenberg, 120 S. Ct. at 2619-20 (O'Connor,J., concurring).







Moreover, the D&X is more protective of future fertility, does
not require hospitalization, and requires less time than other
later term abortionss3s Finally, the possible psychological bene-
fit of seeing and holding an intact fetus is an advantage of the
D&X procedure, as is genetic testing of intact fetuses, useful for
tracing the source of fetal abnormalities.
Additionally, patients who suffer from certain medical con-
ditions benefit from the D&X procedure, instead of the D&E or
induction method. These patients include those who are
more susceptible to uterine injury because of previous Caesar-
ian sections or uterine scarring and those whose fetus is in the
"double footling breech" position.39 Further, a select panel,
brought together by the ACOG, concluded that the D&X may
actually be the "best or most appropriate procedure in a par-
ticular circumstance to save the life or preserve the health of the
mother."' °
The choice of abortion method should be made by the
woman and her physician after considering which risks are
more likely to affect the woman.!6 Eliminating the D&X proce-
dure as an option creates an undue burden to the woman's
right to an abortion because when she is faced with alternatives
that pose greater risks to her health, she may be forced to
choose a riskier procedure or even opt out of an abortion alto-
gether. And, as established years ago in Danforth, if a woman
opts out of an abortion because the available alternatives are too
risky, the ban of the procedure effectively acts as a substantial
obstacle to her right to choose an abortion.3 Although Dan-
forth was decided during the trimester framework regime and
before the majority in Casey gave added value to the states' in-
terests in regulating abortions, the principle that regulations
3" See Massie, supra note 196, at 316.
317 See id at 316-317.
SeeWalther, supra note 68, at 726.
See id.
See Brief of Amici Curiae in support of Respondent, supra note 201, at 22-23.
See id. at 28.
s62 See id at 28-29.




acting as substantial obstacles to a woman's right to choose
abortion are unconstitutional survived the Casey opinion.2
Strong social policies advise heavily against legislative inter-
vention into a medical judgment call about the appropriate sur-
gical technique to use in performing late term abortions.30 If
the D&X procedure turns out to be "bad medicine" in the
medical world, the procedures for its regulations exist, includ-
ing peer review mechanisms, state medical board licensing deci-
sions, and the medical malpractice system."' Until these
procedures prove unable to protect patient welfare while ensur-
ing responsible and ethical medical decision-making, it is consti-
tutionally questionable for Congress to define an acceptable
medical procedure. 7 Only the woman and her physician
should evaluate the risks-not the state legislators." As the
ACOG has proclaimed, the intervention of legislative bodies
into medical decision-making is inappropriate, ill advised, and
dangerous.2"
Moreover, the ban on partial birth abortions does not fur-
ther any constitutionally-valid state interest.370 As Justice Stevens
opined in his concurrence, the Constitution grants women the
right to choose abortion, and the state has no legitimate interest
in requiring the physician performing the abortion to follow
any procedure other than the one the physician believes will be
in the best interests of the mother.7 ' In Casey, the Court held
that regulations that do not impose an undue burden on
women who choose to abort will be upheld in order to further con-
stitutionally valid state interetsS. 72 However, bans of the D&X pro-
s See Planned Parenthood of SE Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
An undue burden is defined as any state regulation that has the effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.
See id.
' See Massie, supra note 196, at 380.
1 See id.
37 see id.
'3 SeeWalther, supra note 68, at 723.
"' SeeAmerican College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Statement of Intact Di-
lation and Extraction, p. 2 (Jan. 12, 1997).
... See Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2617 (2000) (Stevens,J, concurring).
371 See id.
-" See Planned Parenthood of SE Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992).
In response to Justice Kennedy's argument, in his Casey dissent, that the State has a
moral interest in proscribing the D&X procedure, the Casey majority addressed only
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cedure do not protect the potentiality of human life, as the bans
do not outlaw late term abortions, nor do they protect the
health of the mother, as D&X procedures are widely believed to
be the safest late term abortion procedure.'s 3
Although proponents of the statute might cite unnecessary
cruelty to the human fetus as part of the state's interest in pro-
tecting fetal life, there has been no conclusive medical evidence
on the issue of fetal pain offered to the Court.374 Concerning
this matter, Dr. Warren Hem testified to the Senate:
[F]etal neurological development well into the early part of the third
trimester is insufficient for the fetus to experience what we regard as
pain... an adequate neural substrate for experienced pain does not ex-
ist until about the seventh month of pregnancy (thirty weeks), well into
the period when prematurely born fetuses are viable with intensive life
support. Like any other mammalian organism, fetuses have enough
neurological development to permit certain reflexes, but this is not the
same as pain. Interpretation of these reflexes as pain is highly mislead-
ing.75
Other qualified experts, however, were quick to note that in
their experience, fetuses did react to painful stimuli, such as
needle sticks.3' 6 Additionally, nurses assisting in abortion pro-
cedures differ in their descriptions of fetal reactions to painful
stimuli. t77 While one registered nurse stated that the move-
ments made by the fetus during the D&X indicated suffering,
another maintained that at no time during the D&X procedure
is there any fetal movement or response indicative of pain or
struggle."
Because there is no clear evidence of whether fetal pain ex-
ists, it is essential to turn to Dr. Joseph Conomy's studies. Dr.
Conomy is a professor of clinical neurology at Case Western Re-
two valid state interests that can be furthered with abortion restrictions: (1) protect-
ing the potentiality of human life throughout pregnancy and (2) maternal health or
safety. Nowhere in the opinion is it written that states have a moral right to differen-
tiate between abortion procedures. See id. at 878-79.
73 SeeWalther, supra note 68, at 723.
' See Women's Medical Professional Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1073
(S.D. Ohio, 1995).
"7 See Senate Hearing, supra note 314, at 248-49 (statement of Warren M. Hem,
M.D.).
36See Massie, supra note 196, at 350.





serve University and is involved in the field of medical ethics.1 9
He has studied the nervous system "and has worked on prob-
lems of the nervous system in fetuses and newborn infants.""38
Although Dr. Conomy does not commit to an opinion as to
whether a fetus feels pain, as "it would be 'speculative' to try to
'get inside the mind of a fetus, if there is one,.' 38' he claims that
a fetus aborted by the D&E procedure, which involves dismem-
berment, would likely experience as much discomfort as a fetus
aborted by the D&X procedure.32 Yet, the D&E method "is the
abortion technique routinely used for fetuses of thirteen to
nineteen weeks' gestation and never questioned by anyone," ex-
cept for those who oppose abortion in general.38 3 To that end, it
is wholly arbitrary to ban only the D&X procedure based on the
state's interest in preventing cruelty to the human fetus.38 '
V. CONCLUSION
In referring to the women who will be personally touched
by the outcome of the on-going abortion debate, the Court
once stated:
[Their] suffering is too intimate and personal for the state to insist,
without more, upon its own vision of the woman's role, however domi-
nant that vision has been in the course of our history and culture. The
destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own con-
ception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society.
Perhaps with this reasoning in mind, the Supreme Court, in
a 5-4 decision, upheld the Eighth Circuit's decision that a Ne-
braska ban on partial birth abortion was unconstitutional.380
The statutory language and the legislative history, along with
strong Supreme Court precedent, provided support for the
Court's decision. However, with its narrow holding, the Court
did not satisfactorily resolve the issue of partial birth abortion.
379 See Voinovich, 911 F. Supp., at 1072.
8'Id.
"'See id. at 1073.
' See id.
"'See Massie, supra note 196, at 355.
"' See id. See also Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2617 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
"' See Planned Parenthood of SE Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
See Stenberg, 120 S. Ct. at 2617.
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Americans still do not know whether a prohibition of the D&X
method of abortion is constitutional. It is likely, therefore, that
this issue will return to the Supreme Court.
Janeen F. Berkowitz
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